I. INTRODUCTION
UniCredit is one of the most characteristic Russian sanctions cases. It demonstrates that the international arbitration framework is dependent on cooperation between states and that measures such as anti-suit injunctions have little practical significance vis-à-vis a hostile jurisdiction and a party without assets outside that jurisdiction.
II. THE DISPUTE
In 2021 Russian company RusChemAlliance (RCA), concluded two contracts with German company Linde GmbH and Turkish company Renaissance Heavy Industries LLC for the construction of natural gas processing facilities in Russia. RCA made an advance payment of €2 billion, which was guaranteed with bonds from UniCredit Bank and inter alia Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. All bonds included clauses for ICC arbitration in Paris under English law, but did not specify the law applicable to the arbitration agreements.[1] In June 2020, Russia had passed Law No. 171-FZ (the “Lugovoy Law”), which introduced Article 248 Arbitrazh Procedure Code (APC), allowing Russian courts to (1) take exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving foreign sanctions or sanctioned parties, notwithstanding contractual agreements or international treaties providing consent to arbitrate; and (2) to issue anti-suit injunctions (ASIs) to protect their jurisdiction.[2] Courts soon began applying these measures.[3] In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. In response, the EU introduced new sanctions, adding to those imposed on Russia since 2014.[4]
Given these developments, RCA’ contracts did not proceed smoothly, as the German Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control instructed the contractors to stop performing, which they did, citing EU sanctions. Thus, RCA terminated the contracts and pursued the return of its advance payment, demanding UniCredit (and the other banks) pay the issued bonds. UniCredit refused, also citing EU sanctions. On 5 August 2023, RCA filed suit against UniCredit at the Arbitrazh Court of St Petersburg under the new law for €443 million. UniCredit swiftly applied to the High Court of London for an interim ASI, which was granted on August 24th.[5]
After the main hearing, the Court denied a final ASI, holding that English law was not applicable to the arbitration agreement, yet upheld the interim ASI pending appeal.[6] Under the guidelines provided in Enka, absent specification, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is the law chosen to apply to the arbitration. The Court cited an exception that when there is a “provision of the law of the seat which indicates that, where an arbitration is subject to that law, the arbitration agreement will also be treated as governed by that country’s law,”[7] holding that French law (the law of the seat) had such a provision, and thus was applicable. The court also held that England was not the appropriate forum, because substantial justice could be found via arbitration in France.[8]
The Court of Appeal discussed the Dalico case of the Court de Cassation and the UK Supreme Court’s Kabab-Ji decision.[9] It noted that “a choice of Paris as the seat of arbitration [does not mean] ipso facto that French law is to govern the arbitration agreement, but that the law governing the arbitration agreement depends on the parties’ common intention” and that “[t]his falls considerably short of what the Supreme Court contemplated would be sufficient for the exception to apply.” Thus, the regular Enka rule applies, i.e., the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is the law chosen for the arbitration—here, English law.[10] The court also determined it had jurisdiction, as substantial justice could not be obtained in France, because French courts cannot grant ASIs and any arbitral order would be disregarded in Russia.[11] Hence, the court upheld the ASI, based on the applicability of English law, and the English-law policy “that those who agree to arbitrate should adhere to their bargain.”[12]
On 12 February 2024, the Supreme Court granted RCA an appeal on jurisdiction. The Court relied on rule 6.36 Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and para 3.1(6)(c) Practice Direction 6B, which allow a claimant to serve a claim to a defendant outside the jurisdiction when the contract is governed by English law. Lord Reed, one of the justices in Enka, revisited thatdecision, clarifying that a choice of seat cannot prevail over a choice of applicable law when identifying the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, and noting that “[w]hat was said in para 170(vi)(a) should therefore in future be disregarded.”[13] Further, the court endorsed the appellate court’s reasoning that substantial justice could be pursued neither in French courts nor arbitration, and that French justice is not offended by English intervention. It also noted that international instruments, such as Article 9 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (as outlined in Explanatory Note, para 22), also allow injunctions in support of arbitration by states other than the seat (though the relevance of such provisions was not stated).[14]
However, while many commentators were lauding the Supreme Court’s ruling,[15] in reality the UniCredit “Saga” had not yet come to its end. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, RCA applied to the Court in St. Petersburg for an “anti-anti-suit-injunction,” which was issued on 28 December 2024, ordering UniCredit to “take all measures within its control” to cancel the effect of the English ASI under the threat of a €250 million penalty.[16]
UniCredit, being in the disadvantageous position of having significant assets in Russia, whereas RCA has no assets outside the country, complied, applying to the London Court of Appeal to revoke or vary its ASI. The court noted it had the power to vary its own order under CPR Part 3.1(7) and that UniCredit, a private corporation baring the risk of a heavy penalty, was capable of making such a request.[17] While it alluded to potential public international law violations of Russia’s obligation under the New York Convention (NYC) to refer parties to arbitration, the court held that English public policy as a matter of private law was not violated, as the Russian ASI was issued in personam to UniCredit and not to English courts, and UniCredit may also have waived its right to arbitrate.[18] Thus, the Court varied the ASI, discharging the injunctive part, but upholding its reasoning,[19] arguably demonstrating in this manner its disapproval of the Russian court’s stance (which of course was of little to no avail for UniCredit, as RCA’s anti-ASI was upheld by the St Petersburg Commercial Court in April 2025).[20]
III. THE CONTINUOUS ESCALATION OF RUSSIA’S ANTI-ARBITRATION STANCE
Difficulties for arbitration in Russia began as early as 2014, when, following the annexation of Crimea, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia and certain Russian persons.[21] In 2018, the Russian Supreme Court began adopting an increasingly broad interpretation of public policy, refusing to enforce foreign awards against state-owned companies.[22] In June 2020, the Lugovoy law was passed and the following month the Russian Constitution was amended, authorising the Constitutional Court to refuse enforcement of foreign judgments/awards, even when it would be “impossible to refuse enforcement of the judgment/award using the existing regular legislative mechanism.”[23]
While at first, application of Article 248 APC was more conservative, with courts requiring claimants to show that sanctions actually limited their access to justice,[24] this changed in December 2021 with the Uraltransmash case, where the Supreme Court established that the mere fact that a person has been sanctioned creates de facto a presumption that said person’s access to justice is limited.[25] After the break-out of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and the intensification of EU sanctions, Russian courts progressively interfered with proceedings at various institutions (e.g., SCC, ICC),[26] even those considered “neutral” (e.g., HKIAC, SIAC).[27]
Notably, in 2023 the St. Petersburg Court issued a judgment against Linde—one of the contractors of RCA—despite Linde having initiated HKIAC arbitration and the Hong Kong court having issued and upheld an ASI against proceedings in Russia.[28] In March 2024, the Court of St. Petersburg issued an ASI against an ad hoc Stockholm arbitration by Uniper and Methanhandel GmbH against Gazprom, threatening a penalty of a staggering €14.3 billion.[29] In July, the Supreme Court went a step further, establishing a presumption of bias for arbitrators from “unfriendly countries,” notwithstanding the ECHR’s principle of presumption of judicial impartiality.[30] It is also worth noting, that Russian courts have on occasion refused to extend the protections of the Lugovoy Law to non-Russian parties, such as in two cases issued in late 2024, where foreign claimants (respectively German and Polish claimants) were denied the protections of Article 248.1 and referred to the contractually agreed fora.[31]
In 2025, Russia has further entrenched itself. On April 29, the Supreme Court rejected an application by OWH SE i.L. regarding the constitutionality of the Lugovoy Law, notwithstanding the filing of two amicus curiae briefs issued by the Russian Arbitration Association and a Task Force of Russian scholars and professionals.[32] On the same day, the Moscow Commercial Court issued a major ASI, prohibiting German company Wintershall Dea from continuing a €7.5 billion Energy Charter Treaty PCA-administered arbitration.[33] In October 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed another constitutional challenge against the Lugovoy Law, this time by a sanctioned Russian private individual, Mr. Evgeny Novitsky; in this case the Court seemed to slightly narrow the scope of the Lugovoy Law, as it endorsed the lower Court’s decision to deny issuing an ASI against the enforcement of an LCIA award abroad, arguing that Mr. Novitsky could have applied at any earlier point for an ASI before the award was rendered, and thus had effectively waived that right by not doing so.[34] On 25 December 2025, the Constitutional Court rejected a third constitutional challenge, which was filed by Deutsche Bank (in relation to the same facts as in the UniCredit case). Deutsche Bank contended that Lugovoy-Law-based anti-arbitration-injunctions were creating discriminatory situations in foreign arbitral proceedings, as one party could be prevented from taking part in a foreign arbitration, while the other remained free to defend the claim and even bring counterclaims. The Constitutional Court rejected that argument; it concluded that the Lugovoy Law is not inconsistent with the Russian Constitution, since the Constitution protects the right to judicial protection through legal institutions and procedures established for that purpose.[35]
In 2026, business in Russia has become an exceedingly risky prospect. A recent report showed that out of 480 cases where Russian courts considered Article 248 APC, it was applied in 392 (~82% of cases), with courts assessing “actual access to justice” only in a single case.[36] Moreover, sanctions are increasingly affecting arbitration outside of Russia, even in cases where the connection to Russian parties is somewhat remote. For instance, on 15 April 2026, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the enforcement of an LCIA award requested by an Angolan creditor, based on the fact that a Russian sanctioned entity held 41% ownership of the creditor and several members of the board of directors had “Russian sounding names,” thus establishing a sufficient degree of likelihood that the award creditor was under significant Russian influence.[37]
Concerning UniCredit, the St. Petersburg Court has issued a final judgment for payment of €448.2 million to RCA, while assets have been frozen, which—along with Deutsche Bank’s and Commerzbank’s assets—amount to over €700 million.[38] In November 2025, UniCredit’s CEO claimed that it is potentially facing nationalisation of its €3.8 billion worth of assets in Russia,[39] while in December many executives started exiting the company.[40] As recently as April 2026 it has been reported that UniCredit is allegedly already in the process of liquidating all of its assets in Russia.[41] In parallel, in July 2025 the Administrative Court of Lazio upheld the Italian government’s demand that UniCredit must fully exit Russia before it can proceed with its acquisition of Italian bank, Banco BPM, effectively making UniCredit’s domestic growth strategy reliant on the developments in Russia.[42]
IV. CHANGES IN ENGLISH ARBITRATION LAW
It could be argued that the UniCredit case exposed some shortcomings regarding the law applicable to the arbitration agreement absent explicit choice. It showed that the Enka guidelines may have been too complex (a fact already acknowledged by the Law Commission’s report on the 1996 Arbitration Act)[43] and highlighted the need for certainty. The new UK Arbitration Act, (only a draft bill in Parliament during the UniCredit proceedings, mentioned obiter by the Supreme Court),[44] came into force in August 2025 and provides such certainty. It took a stance opposite to Enka, as Section 6A(1)(b) provides that the law of the seat is applicable to the arbitration agreement absent specification, while Section 6A(2) clarifies that a choice of law for the arbitration does not also amount to a choice of law for the arbitration agreement. If and to what degree the Act was influenced by UniCredit remains uncertain.
In January 2026 the London Court of Appeal took a further step towards the direction taken in UniCredit as it confirmed that under section 42 of the Arbitration Act 1996 English courts have the right to enforce ASIs restraining foreign proceedings issued by arbitral tribunals, expressly citing UniCredit.[45]
V. CONCLUSION
UniCredit is arguably the most famous case to date involving Russian sanctions—and for good reason. It is (to the best of this author’s knowledge) the sole case where a Court of Appeal has varied an ASI after request by the beneficiary party (and despite the Supreme Court endorsing jurisdiction). ASIs, a traditionally English instrument, which in the past had generally proven effective in deterring parties from pursuing proceedings abroad, has here been shown to be inadequate. Whether to prevent parties from pursuing arbitration, or to force them to discontinue court proceedings,[46] or (as in UniCredit) to coerce them into requesting revocation of a favourable ASI, Russian courts are consistently threatening parties (as well as counsel and arbitrators)[47] with exorbitant penalties. In practice, the outcome simply depends on where the parties have assets. If (as in UniCredit) a Russian party only has assets in Russia, and its counterparty (whatever its nationality) also has assets in Russia (which is often the case for companies doing business with Russian parties), there is little that party can do to get substantial justice.
Russia’s policies are consistently undermining international dispute resolution and, consequently international trade, given that parties will naturally be losing confidence in the possibility of receiving an equitable outcome in the event of a dispute. Crucially, UniCredit and similar cases have exposed the conditionality of international arbitration, disproving the notion that it is an autonomous system, free from the influence of national courts, but rather reinforcing that arbitration is inherently dependent on national courts and national legislations.[48]
Nevertheless, while Russia’s policies may have temporarily benefited Russian corporations (state-owned or private), they may likely not be beneficial in the long-term. Commentators have pointed out that the measures taken, notably the undermining of international arbitration, are steadily isolating Russian businesses from global trade, while international confidence in Russian courts is also decreasing.[49] An indicative example of this phenomenon can be found in the Linde case (one of RCA’s contractors), where RCA obtained a judgment from a Russian Court (despite ongoing HKIAC arbitration). RCA attempted to enforce that judgment in Kazakhstan (i.e., a jurisdiction not considered “unfriendly” by Russia), yet was finally denied enforcement by the Kazakh court.[50]
In conclusion, a major question is whether Russia’s current predicament is temporary, pending resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, or whether we could see a permanent exit of Russia (and potentially other states) from the international arbitration system, e.g., by withdrawing altogether from the NYC. This remains to be seen.
* * *
Nikos Tosounidis is an LL.M. candidate at NYU School of Law, Class of 2026, specializing in International Business Regulation, Litigation & Arbitration (IBRLA). He earned his first law degree from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and also holds an LL.M. in International and European Legal Studies from the same university. Before joining NYU, he completed his legal traineeship at a law firm in Athens, specializing in cross-border disputes, and became admitted to practice law in Greece.
[1] UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] EWCA Civ 64 [5–7, 9].
[2] KIAP, ‘Antisuit Injunctions and Russian Courts’ Exclusive Jurisdiction under Lugovoy Law (Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of APC)’ (Review of Judicial Practice, 31 August 2024) 2–3 https://perma.cc/Q2LR-UUJX.
[3] See, e.g., JSC Tsargrad Media v Google (Moscow Arbitrazh Court, Case No A40-155367/2020); JSC Sovfracht v Prosperity Estates Ltd (Moscow Arbitrazh Court, Case No A40-156736/2020); JSC Power Machines v DTEK (St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Arbitrazh Court, Case No A56-57238/2020); all discussed in Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer, ‘Overview of the Latest Court Practice on the Russian Sanctions-Related Amendments—Is Winter Coming?’ (26 November 2021) https://perma.cc/8YR3-4KQG.
[4] European Commission, ‘Sanctions Adopted Following Russia’s Military Aggression Against Ukraine’ (Updated December 2025) https://perma.cc/3LWN-WCMG.
[5] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 64) [10–16].
[6] Ibid[31].
[7] Enka Insaat ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 [170(iv), 170(vi)].
[8] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 64) [25–30].
[9] Cour de cassation (1re civ), 20 December 1993 (Dalico); Kabab-Ji SAL (Lebanon) v Kout Food Group (Kuwait) [2021] UKSC 48.
[10] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 64) [61–70].
[11] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 64) [75–78].
[12] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 64) [84–85].
[13] UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] UKSC 30 [16–17, 57–59, 63].
[14] Ibid [86–87, 98, 101–104, 109–110].
[15] See, e.g., Uglješa Grusić, ‘UK Supreme Court Confirms the Role of English Courts as the World’s Arbitral Policemen’ (EAPIL, 23 September 2024) https://perma.cc/PF2H-XDFP; Oliver Binder, ‘Giving Arbitration Teeth: The Supreme Court’s Judgment in UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 26 December 2024) https://perma.cc/96YP-NXKQ.
[16] UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 99 [3, 6].
[17] Ibid [17, 22–27, 30–31].
[18] Ibid [33–36].
[19] Ibid[42–44].
[20] Toby Fisher, ‘UniCredit fails to overturn Gazprom’s Russian injunctions’ (GAR, 10 April 2025) https://perma.cc/9G9H-SVFQ
[21] Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 [2014] OJ L78/6; Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 [2014] OJ L229/1.
[22] Vladimir Khvalei and Irina Varyushina, ‘Russia’ in The Baker McKenzie International Arbitration Yearbook 2018–2019 (Baker McKenzie 2019) para B.6. https://perma.cc/PM2A-EDW7.
[23] Irina Varyushina, ‘Russia’ in Baker McKenzie International Arbitration Yearbook 2020–2021 (Baker McKenzie 2021) para A.1 https://perma.cc/ZJ53-UHG7.
[24] Jürgen Mark, ‘Chronology of the jurisdictional battle between Russia and the European Union caused by the war on Ukraine’ (Global Arbitration News, 5 December 2024) https://perma.cc/8V6D-QC45.
[25] Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No 309-ЭС21-6955 (9 December 2021) (discussed in n 2, 8–9).
[26] See, e.g., No А70-26488/2022; No А40-277243/2022-681909, discussed in Yarik Kryvoi, ‘Exclusive Jurisdiction of Russian Courts: The Impact of Sanctions and the Lugovoy Law’ (CIS Arbitration Forum, 10 September 2024) https://perma.cc/ZJ4Y-CLKM.
[27] See, e.g., No А56-84760/2023; No А40-197598/2023, discussed in Noerr, ‘Russian courts disregard arbitration clauses in favour of Russia-friendly/neutral forums’ (8 December 2023) https://perma.cc/YZ98-JRNZ.
[28] Linde GMBH v. Ruschemalliance LLC [2023] HKCFI 2409 https://perma.cc/JH3P-D3HA.
[29] Valeriya Grebenkova, Leila Kanametova and Olivia Louise Kaye, ‘Search for Justice in an Imperfect World: Gazprom Export v Uniper Global Commodities SE and Methanhandel Gmbh’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 1 October 2024) https://perma.cc/ZQ8V-Y3KY.
[30] Vasilisa Strizh and Polina Sizikova, ‘Russia Limits Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards Rendered by “Unfriendly” Arbitrators’ (Morgan Lewis, 26 September 2024) https://perma.cc/L5UP-6AEK..
[31] See No А66-19469/2024; No А35-6432/2024, discussed in Mikhail Samoylov, ‘Validity of Arbitration Clauses in Russia Since 2022’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 9 September 2025) https://perma.cc/87AY-G6EA.
[32] Stepan Sultanov and others ‘The Lugovoy Law Metamorphosis: The Russian Constitutional Court Declined the Request but Partly Aligned with the Amicus Curiae Briefs’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 30 July 2025) https://perma.cc/4CM6-NJWY.
[33] Susannah Moody, ‘Moscow court injuncts counsel and arbitrators in ECT dispute’ (GAR, 1 May 2025) https://perma.cc/GCJ9-V8BH.
[34] See No А56-84760/2023; No А40-197598/2023, discussed in Jack Ballantyne, ‘Lugovoy Law Survives Third Constitutional Challenge’ (Global Arbitration Review, 6 February 2026) https://perma.cc/69LQ-VDQ8.
[35] Ibid.
[36] See n 2 (Annex).
[37] Susannah Moody, ‘Swiss Court Finds Sanctions Bar Enforcement of LCIA Award’ (Global Arbitration Review, 14 April 2026) https://perma.cc/ZG8F-3JVK.
[38] Elena Fabrichnaya and Alexander Marrow, ‘Russian Court Orders Italy’s UniCredit to Pay $480M for Aborted Gas Project’ (Claims Journal, 26 June 2024) https://perma.cc/4HNP-6575; Jack Ballantyne, ‘Russian court seizes assets of European banks’ (GAR, 20 May 2024) https://perma.cc/7T2S-W9VH.
[39] Global Banking and Finance Review, ‘UniCredit striving to avoid nationalisation of Russian unit, CEO says’ (13 November 2025) https://perma.cc/VL47-SWZZ.
[40] ‘Italy’s UniCredit Moves Toward Russia Exit as Top Executives Quit and Leasing Assets Sold’ The Moscow Times (9 December 2025) https://perma.cc/R38N-L8GJ.
[41] ‘Kommersant Reports UniCredit Abandons Plan to Sell Its Russian Subsidiary, Will Wind Down Operations Instead’ (Meduza, 10 April 2026) https://perma.cc/77YH-FDM4.
[42] Valentina Za, Giuseppe Fonte and Francesca Landini, ‘Court Scraps Some of Rome’s Demands in UniCredit’s BPM Bid, Keeps Russia Exit’ (Reuters, 13 July 2025) https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/court-upholds-part-unicredits-appeal-against-italys-decision-on-banco-bpm-bid-2025-07-12/ accessed 25 April 2026.
[43] Law Commission, Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final report and Bill (Law Com No 413, 2023) para 12.20.
[44] UniCredit (UKSC 30) [28–29].
[45] Tecnimont SpA v LLC EuroChem North-West-2 [2025] EWHC 3151 (Comm) [41–42].
[46] UniCredit (EWCA Civ 99) [8] (referring to proceedings involving Deutsche Bank).
[47] See n 33; see also Bayerische Landesbank v RusChemAlliance [2025] EWHC 924 (Comm).
[48] Franco Ferrari, ‘Is Arbitration a Global Dispute Resolution Phenomenon?’ (2020) 30 Rivista dell’Arbitrato 347, 350–352.
[49] See n 2, 16.
[50] Raid Abu-Manneh and others, ‘Cross-Jurisdictional Clashes in the RCA v. Linde Dispute: Latest Developments’ (Mayer Brown, 17 February 2025) https://perma.cc/NW3J-5YTE.